Ukraine Is Losing the Ballistic Missile War — For Now

Monday dawned over Ukraine with the odour of jet fuel, smoke and blood. Russia hurled 611 drones and 70 missiles in its newest barrage, with Kyiv bearing the brunt. The historic Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, a UNESCO World Heritage site, sustained what city officials called a direct strike. Eight apartment buildings were hit. In Kyiv at least five people died and three dozen were injured. In Kharkiv at least five emergency workers were killed in a deliberate “double-tap” strike. The toll extended a bleak pattern: May was the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since 2022.

As the front stalls, the war moves to factories and supply lines

The thickening aerial battle partly mirrors Russia’s mounting troubles at the front. Since late 2025, Ukraine’s drone-led units have been killing and seriously wounding Russian soldiers faster than the Kremlin can recruit them, reducing its push to a crawl or, in places, even slightly reversing it.

That near-deadlock is moving the war’s centre of gravity away from trenches toward the factories and supply lines behind them. Both sides are reacting with whatever instruments they possess.

Kyiv has leaned into an asymmetrical medium-range drone effort, threatening Russian logistics with fresh precision arms, the newest of them semi-automated. That campaign, among other effects, has triggered a petrol shortage in annexed Crimea.

Moscow, for its part, has simply pounded Ukrainian cities harder and more ruthlessly. Its goals are military as well as psychological: to sap residents’ morale, and to shake foreign allies’ belief that Ukraine can defend itself. In late May Russia’s foreign ministry urged diplomats to leave Kyiv. So far, none have.

Air defence holds against drones — but not against ballistics

For Ukrainian air-defence teams, such nights grow ever more hectic. At peak moments, surges of approaching drones and missiles turn radar screens into a sea of red dots. “It’s like being a goalkeeper facing ten balls at once,” says one officer.

Performance, given that strain, stays respectable. On a typical night Ukraine intercepts more than 90% of the drones and cruise missiles launched at it. Home-built interceptor drones are blunting record-size Shahed raids, often several hundred strong.

Yet a deficit of anti-ballistic interceptors has turned the contest against ballistic missiles — which travel far faster — into a losing one. In the latest raids roughly two-thirds got through. With ballistic defences stretched thin over cities and the grid, each salvo forces painful triage.

Patriot tactics have evolved, but interceptors are running low

Among the systems held by Ukraine, only the American-manufactured Patriot reliably intercepts ballistic missiles. Across three years Ukraine has radically altered employment of the systems. Launchers now fire and move before Russia can find them; batteries run on fewer launchers, and mobile crews have “ambushed” Russian planes that thought they were farther away. The Pentagon has even assigned a team to Ukraine to watch how they are doing it.

But a shortage of interceptors forces crews to make difficult decisions about what to target and what to let through. Since the Iran war started, America and its Gulf allies have burned through stocks of Patriots at a dizzying rate, exacerbating an already acute global shortage. New manufacturing lines are not expected to yield significant results for years.

Fire Point, a Ukrainian start-up with a reputation for over-promising, says it is developing a new anti-ballistic missile. Few insiders believe it will work in the near term.

Russia presses its ballistic missile advantage

Moscow is exploiting the opening to press its overwhelming missile superiority. Ukraine’s missile-engineering school was largely dismantled after the fall of the Soviet Union, at Russia’s and America’s behest. The Kremlin, in contrast, kept working on its catalogue of designs and its working production lines.

This year Ukrainian military intelligence estimates Russia will produce roughly 700 Iskander ground-launched ballistic missiles, alongside 60 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, which are launched from planes, and 30 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles. Combined attacks on Kyiv have held roughly steady this year at about one per week, but ballistic and Zircon missiles make up a growing share of the mix.

Ukraine compensates with drones — and races to rebuild missiles

Ukraine has compensated for its missile scarcity by embracing mass strikes with simpler drones and cruise missiles. It has scored with long-range drone raids, hitting targets deep inside Russia. It embarrassed Vladimir Putin with hits on St Petersburg’s port during his annual economic showcase there in early June. But while holes in Russian air defence offer ever more opportunities, the mass operations remain wildly inefficient.

Only a small minority get through, mainly the fastest weapons (over 350kph). Success rates range from 2% to 35%, depending on the model. Ukraine desperately wants to return to the select group of states that can mass-produce ballistic and advanced cruise missiles, which are harder to intercept and more destructive on impact. Those deep raids meant to carry the war into Russia still depend on volume over precision.

Two ballistic projects in testing

It has at least two ballistic missiles in the testing phase. The Sapsan/Hrim-2, developed by Pivdenmash, the Soviet-era centre of Ukrainian rocket-making, has been in development for decades but has been undermined by corruption and Russian infiltration. The fp-7, a smaller, shorter-range project from Fire Point, combines new Western avionics with an existing Soviet airframe design. The latter is probably closer to serial production.

Yet turning out sufficient missiles able to defeat Russian defences is not straightforward. Rockets are far more complicated than drones, requiring precision in everything from engines to terminal-guidance avionics. Making something fly a long distance is one thing; making it hit the target is even harder.

Financing serial production might be the most difficult part. “You can’t make spades today and rockets tomorrow,” says Andriy Ryzhenko, a former deputy chief of staff of the Ukrainian navy. “Ukraine does have a rocket school, just, but our technology has been frozen for 40 years.”

How close is Kyiv?

How near Ukraine stands depends on whom you ask. Volodymyr Zelensky, in an interview with British media, insisted Ukraine was “very close” to bringing the ballistic war to the Kremlin. If so, the war could take a new shape. Long-range Ukrainian missiles could threaten Russia’s military industry and logistics, and deter Russia from hitting Ukrainian cities indiscriminately.

But an experienced player in the arms industry — whose drones were among those that reached St Petersburg — urges realistic expectations. “The best we can hope for is an ersatz missile,” he says, meaning one cobbled together from Western spare parts. A senior official played down hopes of a Russian-style “missile conveyor belt” any time soon.

What comes next: faster Shaheds and risk of escalation

The immediate danger is further escalation by Russia. It could employ still more destructive weapons, or strike Ukraine’s government and citizens with no pretence of restraint.

Ukraine is bracing for a new generation of jet-powered Shahed drones, built with Chinese engines, that are expected to make up 80% of the fleet from October. The new drones fly too fast for current interceptor drones, and will make it much harder for Ukraine’s air defenders.

Ukraine’s great cities face still more destruction. History suggests that will not break the country’s resolve. But it can make life miserable indeed. With Moscow aiming missiles at shops and supply chains, that misery is increasingly economic as well as physical.

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