Colombia faces a historic choice, writes Iván Duque

After four years of institutional decay, fiscal recklessness and deteriorating security, the country must change course, argues Iván Duque

In a presidential run-off in Colombia on June 21st, Iván Cepeda, a left-wing ally of President Gustavo Petro—who is barred from running again under the constitution—will face the right-wing challenger, Abelardo de la Espriella. But voters will not be going to the polls merely to pick between left and right. What is truly at stake is a contest between two irreconcilable visions of the state: democracy or executive overreach, the rule of law or impunity, technocratic governance or improvisation. To reduce this election to a conventional ideological divide is to miss its deeper significance.

Two visions of the state

The current government has spent four years testing the limits of the 1991 constitution. For all its imperfections, that charter gave Colombia an independent judiciary, a functioning system of checks and balances, and a framework for political pluralism that survived decades of terrorism. The efforts by the administration of Mr Petro to intimidate the courts, pack regulatory bodies and rule by decree whenever Congress refused to comply are not mere expressions of political disagreement. They reflect an authoritarian disposition that treats institutional constraints as obstacles rather than as the foundations of the republic itself. Mr Cepeda is cut from much the same cloth as Mr Petro. The opposition candidate, Mr de la Espriella, by contrast, defends a model of liberal democracy in which power has real limits, judges are independent and rules apply equally to the governed and those who govern them.

Impunity versus legality

But the institutional argument is only part of the story. This election also confronts Colombians with a fundamental choice between impunity and legality. Between 2014 and 2018, under the government of my predecessor as president, Juan Manuel Santos, the transitional justice framework negotiated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (farc) conferred extraordinary benefits on the guerilla group’s leadership. Its commanders received what were termed “alternative” sanctions for crimes against humanity, arrangements that involved no custodial sentences and preserved their eligibility to hold elected office. These guarantees were embedded in the constitutional order even after Colombians had rejected the original peace agreement at the ballot box in 2016. The result was a process built on a foundational contradiction: the people said no, yet political operators found a procedural route to turn that no into a yes.

Colombia does not need another negotiation—as Mr Cepeda promises through a continuation of Mr Petro’s “Total Peace” policy—that puts the comfort of armed actors over the rights of their victims. It needs a state that punishes criminals rather than rewarding them.

Governing by slogan

Beyond institutions and legality lies a third issue equally decisive for the country’s future: the capacity to govern. The outgoing government will leave Colombia in serious difficulties. Its fiscal deficit is among the highest in the world relative to the size of its economy, and public debt has reached record levels. The health-care system is close to collapse. The energy sector faces serious supply shortages after years of regulatory paralysis and hostility to private investment. The security environment has deteriorated sharply as armed groups have expanded, propelled by the largest area of illicit coca cultivation ever recorded in the country, with critical implications for Colombia and its neighbours. None of this is bad luck. It is the consequence of governing by slogan rather than by plan; populism dressed up as transformation.

The record of 2018-22

Recent Colombian history offers a telling contrast. The 2018-22 government that I led achieved the highest annual rate of growth in Colombia’s modern history as the economy rebounded from the covid-19 pandemic. We also delivered the largest reduction in “multi-dimensional” poverty since records for this metric—which takes account of more than just income—began a decade earlier. Moreover, despite having questioned central aspects of the 2016 peace deal, it prioritised institutional responsibility above all else. It respected the constitutional order, observed the law and implemented the peace accords, having inherited budget constraints, institutional gaps and limited state presence in the regions most affected by criminality.

Despite those conditions, the peace process advanced on a number of important fronts: for instance, 16 regional development plans were implemented for conflict-affected areas, and more than 100,000 land titles were given out. In parallel, the government approved constitutional amendments that prevent crimes such as drug-trafficking or kidnapping from being eligible for amnesty. The lesson is clear: peace and the rule of law are not in conflict. Colombia does not have to choose between security and reconciliation.

Peace built on the state’s retreat is no peace at all

Colombia cannot afford a model of peacebuilding that prizes international applause above the safety of its citizens. It should not sacrifice institutional capacity to appease armed groups in hopes of securing a Nobel prize or a flattering headline abroad. That approach has already cost the country dearly. In 2015 the suspension of aerial eradication of illicit crops, justified on health and environmental grounds that were never rigorously demonstrated, coincided with an explosive and sustained surge in coca cultivation and cocaine production. Peace built on the retreat of the state from its own territory is no peace at all, but the postponement of war, paid for by future governments and future generations.

A historic choice

Colombia now faces a historic choice. After four years of institutional decay, fiscal recklessness and deteriorating security conditions, the country has the opportunity to change course. The 2026 election is about more than this or that candidate’s political leanings. It is a decision about the country Colombians want to build for their children, and about the strength of the institutions that will make that future possible.

Iván Duque Márquez was the president of Colombia from 2018 to 2022. He is a distinguished fellow and member of the World Leaders Circle at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford.

Read the guest essay on Colombia’s run-off by another former president, Juan Manuel Santos.

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