Europe Owns the Ukraine War — But Still Lacks a Strategy for Peace

Washington has stepped back, so Europe now manages the war

At the same time, Ukraine’s recent battlefield advances have renewed a feeling that diplomacy might move again. Europe seeks to fill the space left by stalled American efforts. In February, Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, said: “We will be part of the solution, and we should be part of the discussion.” For the first time, those remarks sound like description rather than supplication.

Katarina Mathernova, the EU’s ambassador to Ukraine, says Europe’s backing “has been more resilient than we could have dared imagine.” Yet while assuming the lead gives Europe influence, ministers and officials admit their capitals are still searching for a doctrine beyond preserving Ukraine’s survival.

Searching for a doctrine beyond survival

In recent weeks policymakers have hastily floated dispatching an envoy to bargain with Mr Putin — with suggested names spanning Angela Merkel and Mario Draghi — lacking clarity over European objectives. On May 28th Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign-policy co-ordinator, deemed it wise to play down the speculation.

European officials agree that Mr Putin is in a tight spot. Yet few see any sign that he is willing to row back on his demands. That limits the potential for meaningful talks. One official says Europe will have nothing to offer Mr Putin except a gradual slowing of further sanctions. Margus Tsahkna, Estonia’s foreign minister, says: “We are not against negotiations if they are real. But there is nothing to talk about yet.”

The confusion reflects differing aims. Some European governments want to sound out Russia’s red lines via “mediation” efforts, which could involve individual go-betweens rather than governments, or non-EU states such as Turkey. A serious negotiation with Mr Putin, in which Europe would sit on Ukraine’s side, still appears to be a way off. One foreign minister says: “I think we need both.” Some of the most intensive discussions about potential talks are taking place among the E3: Britain, France and Germany. That could revive fears among eastern European countries such as Poland that western countries might seek a “reset” with Russia over their heads. Ukraine is also sceptical.

The accession trap

Should Mr Putin grow willing to compromise, a ceasefire would probably require Ukraine to accept a loss of territory in the eastern Donbas region. Beyond providing as-yet-vague security guarantees, Europe’s best way of sugaring that pill is to speed up Ukraine’s bid to join the EU, something Ukrainians have craved since the Maidan revolution of 2014. Last year suggestions emerged — during peace talks led by America — that Ukraine could join the EU as soon as 2027. But although Mrs von der Leyen and others are pushing to keep Ukraine’s dream alive, that date is utterly implausible for a large, partly corrupt country with an income per person roughly one-third of Bulgaria’s. Officials believe Ukraine would be lucky to join in a decade.

That leaves a growing gulf between Ukraine’s sky-high hopes and many EU governments’ willingness to let the topic slide. To arrest that, Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor, recently proposed an “associate membership” that would see Ukraine granted access to various EU institutions with limited or no voting rights, subsidies or single-market access. Alexander Gabuev, the Berlin-based director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, a think-tank, says this is probably “as good as it’s going to get for Ukraine”. But the proposal has flopped among Ukrainians, who hear it as code for sitting in indefinite limbo. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, immediately dismissed Mr Merz’s suggestion as “unfair”.

One or more negotiating “clusters” may be opened at an EU summit this month. But, as one European official says, “the accession discussion is hypocritical on both sides.” Europeans think Mr Zelensky’s failure to rein in expectations is irresponsible. They also worry that making an exception for Ukraine would upset aspirants in the Balkans. Meanwhile, among Ukrainians a new mood of scepticism towards the West is emerging. New polling finds that nearly three-quarters of Ukrainians still back EU membership — but that support has fallen most quickly among the young.

As the country has taken on a growing share of responsibility for its own defence, including the manufacture of arms and drone technology sought by partners across the world, it wants recognition of the shifting balance of power. Jana Kobzova, a Ukraine-watcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations, says: “I see a deep change in Ukraine’s identity. Where they once saw the EU as a saviour, now it’s about self-reliance. Many say, ‘We are protecting you now.'”

Reformers in Ukraine still hope to use the EU’s money and political pledges as a barrier against authoritarian drift. Lana Zerkal, a Ukrainian diplomat, says: “EU accession is like a light in the tunnel for Ukraine.” Conditions have been attached to the €90bn package, to Mr Zelensky’s chagrin. The first stage of the accession process requires rule-of-law reforms by 2027 before funding is released. Yet the slow pace of reform in Ukraine frustrates European officials. One says: “We need to see more effort in Kyiv. They need to help us advocate for them.”

Keeping Ukraine in the fight

Time is short. Although Ukraine’s “long-range sanctions”, as Mr Zelensky calls its drone and missile strikes inside Russian territory, have lifted spirits, no one knows how long that will last. Russia is escalating its attacks on Kyiv and other cities, and further attacks on power and water infrastructure could make next winter even harder than the last.

For now, European arms and money keep Ukraine in the game. Last week Mr Zelensky struck a deal with Sweden for fighter jets that could help stop cruise missiles. But Europe cannot yet provide the anti-ballistic missiles needed to protect Ukraine’s cities. Last week Mr Zelensky also sent a letter to Donald Trump appealing for Patriot interceptors.

Europe’s own political clock

Meanwhile Europe’s own clock is ticking. Next year brings elections in most of its bigger countries, starting with France in April. Foreign-policy analysts worry that if the populist-right National Rally secures the presidency it would try to pull the plug on some of Europe’s commitments, including fundraising. It would certainly oppose Ukraine’s EU bid. Fabrice Pothier, a former NATO official now at Rasmussen Global, a consultancy, says: “The French farmers have not woken up to this yet. We have not started the hard part.”

Hope is not a strategy

Intensifying discussions over aid, diplomacy and accession show that Europe is taking responsibility for the war on its eastern flank. But much of its plan still rests on hope: that Ukrainian resolve will not be broken, that Mr Trump can somehow be persuaded to turn against Russia, or that Mr Putin can be forced to negotiate. Mr Pothier says: “This is clearly Europe’s war now. The question is whether it can be Europe’s peace.”

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